Recent empirical and anecdotal evidence suggest that U.S. firms hold a significant amount of cash on their balance sheets. Motivated by this observation, we seek to examine whether the firm's customer base, in particular the amount of sales transactions between a firm and the U.S. government affects the amount of its cash holdings. Building on numerous research streams in the literature to date, we predict and find that firms that have the U.S. government as a major customer hold fewer amounts of cash and have less volatile future earnings. In addition, our evidence suggests that the firm's suppliers take into account the relation between these firms and the U.S. government by providing less trade credit. To address any endogeneity concerns we use the 2000 presidential elections as an exogenous shock and our main findings continue to hold. Our focus on the U.S. government as a determinant of firm's cash holdings has not been addressed before in the literature and therefore advances our understanding why firms might hold less cash rather than more.
Introduction
The amounts of cash holdings of public U.S. firms are economically significant and have been growing constantly over time. In particular, as of fiscal year 2011, the aggregate cash holdings of firms included in Compustat amounted to $10.8 trillion that consists of 41% of the overall market capitalization of these firms. Moreover, recent evidence in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) suggests that the average cash-to-assets ratio more than doubles over their sample period, from 10.6% in 1980 to 23.2% in 2006. Seeking to understand why firms hold large amounts of cash has been the focus of academic research for a long time. To date, numerous determinants have been found to affect the level of cash holdings, such as transaction costs, adverse shocks, financial distress, repatriation taxes, and agency problems.
In this paper we investigate and provide a new explanation for the observed level of cash holdings as we examine whether firms' interaction with the U.S. government as a major customer reduces their motives to hold cash. Being a firm's major customer, the U.S. government has several unique features compared to other customers, such as other firms, individuals, and nonprofit organizations. First, firms that engage in transactions with the U.S. government are inevitably affected by changes in government spending that is largely determined by political factors, such as the political environment, political cycles, and election results. Second, the government's objectives are different from other customers, and thus its transactions with firms are often due to considerations about social welfare, for example, reducing unemployment rate, enhancing national security, encouraging technology development, etc. In addition, the process of government procurement is regulated by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which is significantly different from the process of transactions between the firm and other customers.
1 Moreover, firms' transactions with the U.S. government could be potentially affected by their engagement in political activities, such as lobbying or campaign donations (e.g., Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2013) . Finally, the U.S. government is expected to have better solvency and lower bankruptcy risk than average customers.
To the extent that engaging in major sales to the U.S. government reduces uncertainty of future operating performance and increases exploitation from suppliers, we predict that these firms have lower cash holdings as compared to other firms. Our research design consists mainly of multiple regressions of cash holdings (defined as the natural logarithm of cash and cash equivalents over noncash assets) on prior determinants of cash holdings identified in the literature and a measure that captures sales made to the U.S. government. 2 We identify whether sales to the U.S. government can be classified as a transaction with a major customer by utilizing the data being disclosed following the new segment reporting requirements in SFAS 14 and 131 which identifies major customer sales greater or equal to 10 percent of total sales.
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Our results show that sales to the U.S. government affect firms' future profitability. In particular, we find that the volatility of future profitability measured over a period of three years is lower for firms that engage in substantial transactions with the U.S. government. Based on these findings we claim that these firms require less cash to cope with future potential adverse shocks. The negative relation between sales to the U.S. government and corporate cash holdings 1 See section 2.4 for details on the U.S. government procurement process. 2 Following prior literature, we use the terms "cash" and "cash and cash equivalents" interchangeably in this paper. 3 The FASB issued the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 14 (SFAS 14) that requires disclosure of public firms' major customers in 1976. SFAS 30 amended SFAS 14, and SFAS 131 suspended both SFAS 14 and 30 in 1997. SFAS 14 stipulates that "if 10 percent or more of the revenue of an enterprise is derived from sales to any single customer, that fact and the amount of revenue from each such customer shall be disclosed." SFAS 131 reiterates "if revenues from transactions with a single external customer amount to 10 percent or more of an enterprise's revenues, the enterprise shall disclose that fact, the total amount of revenues from each such customer, and the identity of the segment or segments reporting the revenues." Regulation S-K of the SEC sets similar disclosure requirements.
is also attributable to the exploitation from the firms' suppliers. Specifically, our results suggest that suppliers extend less trade credit to firms with U.S. government sales, and thus reduce the firms' cash holdings, assuming that suppliers are informed about the firms' sales to major customers by having access to their segment disclosures. In addition, we find that firms with U.S.
government sales have lower marginal value of cash holdings and they tend to spend more of their operating cash flows. To address any endogeneity concerns related to our analysis, we use the 2000 presidential elections as an exogenous shock. This quasi-natural experiment allows us to draw causal statements on the relation between sales to the U.S. government and the level of cash holdings. Our main findings continue to hold using this specific setting, which increases our confidence in the reported findings.
We make four contributions to the extant literature. First, we add to the literature on corporate cash holdings that identifies the determinants and consequences of cash holdings for U.S. firms. To date, previous research has shown that the main determinants of cash holdings include transaction costs, adverse shocks, financial distress, repatriation tax, and agency problems. Our study is the first to identify another important determinant of cash holdings -the firm's customer base and in particular the relation between the firm and the U.S. government.
We utilize this characteristic by first identifying whether the U.S. government indeed engages in business transactions with a particular firm and subsequently measure the amount of sales made to this major customer. In addition, our study expands the literature on customer-supplier relationships along the supply chain. Prior research did not focus on specific major customer characteristics and how this might affect the strategic interaction between the firm and its suppliers. Given that the U.S. government consists of a major customer for numerous firms it is economically important to examine how this might affect both the firm's own business strategy as well as the strategy employed by the firm's suppliers which are assumed to be aware of the existing relation between the firm and the U.S. government.
Our third contribution relates to the existing literature on political connections attributes.
Prior research focused on lobbying and campaign contributions and examined how these activities affect firms' corporate strategies and subsequently the firms' performance and market value. We add to this line of research by identifying an additional attribute of political connections, resulting from the observation that the U.S. government can be identified as a major customer for many firms. Our evidence is important as U.S. firms can be politically connected through the firm-customer channel apart from the existing known channels such as lobbying and campaign contributions. The implications of our findings are important as one can easily identify and classify whether a firm is more likely to be politically connected by simply analyzing its sales to major customers.
Finally, our study expands the existing literature on the consequences of detailed segment disclosures along two streams. The first one relates to the lower value investors assign to cash holdings of firms disclosing the U.S. government as their major customer. In addition, the disclosure of sales to major customers affects the firm's suppliers in their strategic interaction with the firm. To date, most of the literature on segment disclosures focused on the costs and valuation benefits of these specific disclosures without taking into account the specific attributes of the information being actually provided at the segment level. We emphasize that one specific piece of information, which relates to the sales made to major customers, is not only value relevant to the firm's investors but it also affects the behavior of its suppliers. Our study is the first to identify and investigate this important and overlooked attribute. As such, our evidence is also relevant to the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of increased segment disclosures, beyond the known arguments advanced so far in the literature relating mainly to competitive costs and capital markets valuation benefits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literatures on corporate cash holdings, supply chain, and political connections. Section 3 discusses our empirical methodology, including our sample construction and estimation equations. Sections 4
and 5 discuss our empirical evidence, and section 6 concludes.
Background and hypotheses
Our paper unites three streams of research that have previously been disparate, one on corporate cash holdings, the second on customer-supplier relations and the other on firms' political connections. We first discuss related research in each stream, introduce the procurement process of the U.S. government, and build on the existing body of evidence to develop our hypotheses.
Corporate Cash Holdings
Since Keynes (1936) , numerous papers attempt to explain why firms hold a large amount of cash and cash equivalents as part of their assets even though there are opportunity costs for doing so. Recent studies document that the average cash-to-assets ratio of U.S. industrial firms more than doubled over the past thirty years (e.g., Bates et al., 2009; Duchin, 2010) . As summarized by Bates et al. (2009) , four different theories have been identified to explain the determinants of firms' cash holdings: the transaction motive, the precautionary motive, the agency motive, and the tax motive.
First, according to the transaction motive, firms incur transaction costs associated with converting a noncash asset into cash, so they can save transaction costs by using cash to make payments without having to liquidate assets or raise any external capital (e.g., Miller and Orr, 1966; Mulligan, 1997) . Thus, larger firms tend to hold lower amounts of cash and cash equivalents, as economies of scale are associated with these transaction costs. The second theory advanced in prior research is the precautionary motive that suggests that firms hold cash to better cope with adverse shocks when access to capital markets is costly (e.g., Han and Qiu, 2007) .
Consistent with this theory Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) document that firms reserve larger amounts of cash and cash equivalents when they have riskier future cash flows and limited access to outside capital. In addition, Opler et al. (1999) provide evidence implying that firms facing a better investment opportunities set have more cash holdings as negative shocks and financial constraints are more costly for them.
The third theory advanced in the literature is referred to as the agency motive. Under this view, entrenched managers would rather retain cash than increase payouts to shareholders when the firm has poor investment opportunities (e.g., Jensen, 1986) . In line with the agency motive, prior research has shown that firms hold more cash in countries with greater agency problems (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003) . In addition, cash holdings are valued less when agency costs are regarded to be higher (e.g., Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Dittmar and MahrtSmith, 2007; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006 
Supplier-customer relations
A large body of research has been developed to address how the relation between the firm and its stakeholders affects operating performance and corporate strategies, such as investment policies, capital structure choices, and financial reporting/accounting choices. An important aspect of this relation is the interaction between the firm and its major customers and suppliers.
Prior research documents that the supplier-customer relation influences the firm's operating performance. Gosman, Kelly, and Warfield (2004) find that retail firms that have major customers (those that account for at least 10 percent of total sales) have higher profitability and more persistent profits, and that investors understand these attributes. Patatoukas (2012) finds that concentrated customer base increases a firm's profitability by reducing its operating expenses and enhancing asset utilization. In addition, the supplier-customer relation affects corporate strategies. For example, Pandit, Wasley, and Zach (2011) Yeung (2012) show that the importance of a firm's economic performance to its suppliers and customers leads to a demand from these stakeholders for the firm to report more conservatively.
In summary, firms' strategies, such as investment policies, capital structure choices, and disclosure decisions, are largely influenced by their relations with their major suppliers and customers.
Political connections
The third stream of literature that we build upon investigates how firms' political connections relate to their operating performance and value creation. Prior research measures firms' political connections as the amounts of lobbying expenditures, campaign contributions, and/or private access to government officials (e.g., Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 2010; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012) .
Evidence documented in the literature to date suggests that firms with political connections receive favorable treatments and a competitive advantage compared to other firms (e.g., Faccio, 2006 and 2010) . For example, politically-connected firms are more likely to have preferential access to capital, obtain government procurement contracts, and receive government investments (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Cull and Xu, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2010; Goldman et al., 2013 by outside parties such as the media and opposing political parties (e.g., Faccio, 2006) . Therefore, it is noteworthy that the effects of political connections could be under certain circumstances unfavorable to the firm.
Hypothesis Development
The process of awarding government contracts begins when acquisition personnel working for the U.S. federal government post a solicitation on the Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) Website, after determining their agency's requirements (that is, the goods and/or services the specific agency needs). Interested companies submit their offers in response to the solicitation in accordance with applicable provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Agency personnel evaluate the offers and make the final decision.
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Building on prior research we develop and test three main hypotheses. One of our main innovations compared to the literature to date is the use of firms' sales to the U.S. government to proxy for their political connections. We believe that this measure captures firms' relation with the U.S. government from a new perspective, that is, firms' political connections through the supply chain. In addition, this connection is different from traditional supplier-customer relations, since the customer is no longer an individual or a business organization, but rather a government/federal entity.
As discussed previously, prior research finds that a firm's performance and business strategies are affected by its customer base. However, it is unclear whether having the U.S.
government as a major customer will influence the firm's capital structure decisions as reflected in the amount of its cash holdings. On the one hand, firms that have political connections and a concentrated customer base have higher long-term operating and stock performances and better access to external capital (e.g., Goldman et al., 2009; Cooper et al., 2010; Boubakri , Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar, 2012; Patatoukas, 2012) , and thus, firms that have the U.S. government as their major customer should enjoy similar competitive advantages so that they could afford to hold less cash for the transaction and precautionary motives. For instance, the U.S. government is supposed to be less likely to dishonor promised payables compared to individuals and/or business organizations, so firms that have government major customers should be less financially constrained and their demand for cash to cope with future adverse shocks should be lower. In addition, a concentrated customer base increases operational efficiency and enhances asset utilization (Patatoukas, 2012) , suggesting that firms that have the U.S. government as a major customer may reserve lower amounts of cash due to better utilization of their assets. Finally, more sales to the U.S. government may indicate lower foreign sales that have potential tax costs of repatriation, so firms that have government major customers should hold smaller cash balances, due to the tax motive.
However, profitable firms usually face potential competitions from industry rivals (e.g., Fresard, 2010; Haushalter et al., 2007) . According to the precautionary motive, it is possible that firms that have government major customers may demand higher cash reserves to deal with any potential adversity in product market competition. Moreover, firms with less competitive product markets are more negatively affected by weak corporate governance (e.g., Giroud and Mueller, 2011) . If firms that have government major customers have more problematic corporate governance relative to other firms, their excess cash holdings would be higher than others.
Therefore, it is unclear whether having the U.S. government as a major customer would affect corporate cash holdings. The two competing predictions discussed previously lead to the first hypothesis:
H1. Firms that have the U.S. government as a major customer hold less cash relative to other firms.
In the next two hypotheses, we propose two channels through which having the U.S.
government as a major customer affects corporate cash holdings. The first channel is based on the relation between a firm's customer base and trade credit obtained from its suppliers. On the one hand, firms that have the U.S. government as a major customer would have less cash available on balance sheets if the suppliers extend less trade credit to them. Prior research shows that suppliers extend less trade credit to less financially-constrained customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). If firms that have government major customers are less financially-constrained than other firms, the exploitation of the relationship by their suppliers will leave the firms with less cash. On the other hand, firms will receive more trade credit from the suppliers when they have higher bargaining power or market power (Wilner, 2000; Giannetti et al., 2011) . Thus, firms that have government major customers should receive more trade credit, because of their better financial position. If sales to the U.S. government have positive effects on the level and/or persistence of future profits and the suppliers could obtain this information from the firm's segment disclosures, having government major customers will influence the suppliers' decision with regards to the amount of trade credit they extend to the firm. Therefore, our second hypothesis states:
H2. Firms that have the U.S. government as a major customer receive less trade credit from their suppliers relative to other firms.
The second channel through which having government major customers would affect corporate cash holdings is related to the precautionary motive for cash holdings. As discussed previously, corporate cash holdings is a function of both expected future profitability and the ability to cope with adverse shocks when access to external capital markets is costly (e.g., Han et al., 2013; Goldman et al., 2013) . As a result, firms that are more exposed to government purchases will be more affected by political uncertainty, and thus may experience more volatile incomes. Therefore, it is unclear whether having government major customers would affect the level and volatility of future profitability. 5 We formulate our third hypothesis as follows:
H3. Firms that have the U.S. government as a major customer have higher levels and/or lower volatilities of future earnings relative to other firms.

Sample selection and research design
Sample selection
We obtain our sample from the Compustat Segment Files that provide the types and names of major customers of U.S. public firms along with the dollar amount of annual sales generated from each major customer, i.e., those account for at least 10 percent of sales or are otherwise considered important for business (also see footnote 3). The initial sample consists of all major customer observations on the Compustat segment files from 1978 to 2012. Next, we require firm-years with major customer information to have both financial statement data on the Compustat annual database and stock return data on the CRSP monthly file. We remove observations with insufficient information to calculate our primary explanatory variables that calibrate a firm's sales to different types of major customers (details are provided in Section 3.2).
Following prior research on corporate cash holdings (e.g., Bates et al., 2009), we exclude financial firms and utilities (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999), because their cash holdings are subject to capital requirements and regulations. We further require all the observations to have information of current and one-year lagged cash holdings, market value of equity, total assets, total debt, and annual stock returns. Our final sample contains 66,015 firm-year observations over the period 1978 -2012. Some analyses impose additional data requirements that further reduce the sample size.
Research Design
We use a firm's sales to major customers as a percentage of its total sales ( ) to gauge the importance of major customer sale to its business and the concentration of its customer base. The Compustat segment file classifies a firm's major customers into seven types (Compustat: CTYPE), including domestic government that represents the U.S. federal government ("GOVDOM"), state government ("GOVSTATE"), local government ("GOVLOC"), company ("COMPANY"), geographic region ("GEOREG"), market ("MARKET"), and foreign government ("GOVFRN"). Based on this classification, we decompose into three components: percentage sales to government major customers ( ), percentage sales to corporate major customers ( ), and percentage sales to other major customers ( ). 6 Specifically, includes sales to the first three major customer classifications, represents sales to the fourth major customer classification, 7 6 We replace total sales in Compustat annual file with the sum of sales to all major customers in Compustat segment file whenever the former amount is lower than the latter one. 7 We also measure a firm's sales to the U.S. government as a major customer using an indicator variable. Our (untabulated) results are robust to this alternative measure.
refers to sales to the last three major customer classifications, and the sum of the three components equals . 8 To test our first hypothesis (H1), we regress corporate cash holdings on or the three components of (i.e., SaleGov%, SaleFirm%, and SaleOther%) and a set of control variables.
where the subscript i, j, t stands for firm i, industry j, and year t. Following previous research (e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Bates et al., 2009) , is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash and cash equivalents over net assets, where net assets equal total assets minus cash and cash equivalents. , , and reflect sales to government major customers, to corporate major customers, and to other major customers, respectively. Our first hypothesis (H1) predicts that firms that have the U.S. government as a major customer would hold less cash relative to other firms, so the coefficient on should be negative ( ) in Equation (1).
Control variables are computed per previous studies (e.g., Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Bates et al., 2009; Liu and Mauer, 2011; Gao et al., 2013) . We use the natural logarithm of net assets ( ) to measure firm size, because economy of scale reduces the demand for cash.
We measure investment opportunities and growth opportunities using the ratio of market value to net assets ( ) and the ratio of R&D expenditures to net assets ( ), respectively.
Firms with better investment opportunities and/or growth opportunities would hold more cash, since it would be more costly for these firms to be financially constrained. We also include the ratio of free cash flows to net assets ( ) and the ratio of working capital to net assets 
where the subscript i, j, t stands for firm i, industry j, and year t. The dependent variable is oneyear leading return-on-asset ( ) or the volatility of return-on-asset in the next three years ( ). Our third hypothesis (H3) predicts that firms that have government major customers will experience higher and more stable streams of future earnings. Thus, the coefficient on ( ) should be positive and negative when the dependent variables are future earnings level and future earnings volatility, respectively. Our control variables in Eq. (3) include current return-on-asset ( ), historical earnings volatility ( ), market capitalization ( ), the book-to-market ratio ( ), firm age ( ), and industry and year fixed effects. 
Empirical results
Summary statistics
Government sales and cash holdings (tests of H1)
Our first hypothesis (H1) predicts that firms that have the government as a major customer hold less cash than other firms. As discussed previously, we regress corporate cash holdings on total percentage sales to all major customers combined ( ) or on the three components of , i.e., percentage of sales to government major customers ( ),
percentage of sales to corporate major customers ( ), and percentage of sales to other major customers ( ). show that the coefficient on is significantly lower than those on and , providing further evidence to support the second explanation.
To investigate whether the relation between and cash balances stays negative for the government-sales sample, we eliminate firm-year observations that have major customers other than the U.S. government, and re-estimate Equation (1). Consistent with the results in Table 3 provides evidence to support our first hypothesis (H1).
Government sales and trade credit
Our second hypothesis (H2) predicts that suppliers provide less trade credit to firms that have government major customers. We examine the relation between trade credit and sales to major customers by estimating Eq. (2). Table 4 reports the parameter estimates. Similar to the coefficient on in Table 3 , the one in Table 4 is also insignificant (coeff. = -0.026, t = 0.79). Thus, we further examine whether sales to different types of major customers have offsetting effects on trade credit. We focus on the regression results in column 2 that included all three components of . Consistent with our second hypothesis (H2), the coefficient on is significantly negative (coeff. = -0.235, t = -3.74), whereas the ones on and are reliably positive and insignificant, respectively (coeff. = 0.103, t = 2.56;
coeff. = -0.056, t = -1.17). Moreover, the F-tests show that the coefficient on is significantly lower than the ones on and (at the 0.01 level). These results suggest that firms that have government major customers obtain less trade credit from their suppliers relative to other firms. Because of their better future financial performance (see Section 4.4), the suppliers tend to extend less trade credit to them, reducing their cash reserves.
When a firm increases the percentage sales to the U.S. government from zero to 50 percent of total sales, their trade credit will be 11.8 percent lower than previous (= 1-exp(-0.235 × 50%)).
In addition, the coefficient on is reliably negative in column 6 (coeff. = -0.132, t = -1.73), indicating that having government major customers affects the suppliers' decision of extending trade credit to the firms.
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Ma and Martin, 2012), we find that suppliers provide more trade credit to firms that are younger ( ), less profitable ( ), and non-dividend-paying ( ). Firm obtain more trade credit from the suppliers when they are larger ( ) and more leveraged ( ). In addition, trade credit increases with sales growth ( ), liquidation value ( ), and operating cycles ( ), and decreases with current ratio ( ) and book-to-market ratio ( ). In summary, the results in Table 4 support our second hypothesis (H2).
Government sales and future earnings
Our third hypothesis (H3) predicts that firms that have the government as a major customer will experience better and more stable streams of future income so that they could afford holding less cash to cope with future adverse shocks. We examine the association of percentage sales to major customers with future earnings level ( ) and future earnings volatility ( ) by estimating Equation (3). The parameter estimates are reported in Table 5 . The coefficients on are reliably negative in column 1 (coeff. = -0.030, t = -5.65) and reliably positive in column 3 (coeff. = 0.014, t = 3.47), revealing that total sales to major customers are negatively related to future earnings level and positively related to future earnings volatility. Thus, it is important to further investigate whether different types of major customers have different impacts on the stream of future earnings. Consistent with the results in column 1, the coefficients on , , and are all negative in column 2 (coeff. = -0.012, t = -1.81; coeff. = -0.055, t = -7.51; coeff. = -0.006, t = -0.99).
However, the F-tests in column 2 show that the coefficient on is significantly higher than the one on but not very different from the one on This evidence suggests that the negative association of with future earnings level is mainly driven by sales to corporate major customers ( ) rather than sales to other major customers ( and ). On the other hand, the results in column 4 show that the coefficient on is reliably negative (coeff. = -0.008, t = -1.66), while those on and are positive (coeff. = 0.034, t = 6.90; coeff. = 0.006, t = 1.12).
The F-tests in column 4 show that the coefficient on is significantly lower than those on and . This evidence implies that having corporate major customers increases future earnings volatility, whereas having government major customers reduces the volatility. Taken together, firms that have government major customers are less likely to have adverse earnings shocks in the future, and thus have a weaker precautionary motive to hold cash.
Additional tests
Customer base and the value of cash
In this section, we explore whether lower cash holdings of firms that have government Table 6 indicate that firms that have government major customers are less financially-constrained, and thus have lower marginal value of cash holdings.
The impact of customer base on the sensitivity of cash holdings to operating cash flows
Next, we explore whether firms that have government major customers save less cash out of operating cash flows, given the lower marginal value of cash holdings. This test will provide further evidence to support our previous findings that firms that sell products to the U.S.
government as a major customer have lower cash holdings and lower marginal value of cash. We expect that, relative to other firms, firms that have government major customers would save a smaller portion of their operating cash flows, as measured by the sensitivity of cash holdings to operating cash flows. Specifically, we estimate the following regression adopted from Almeida et al. (2004): Table 7 presents the parameter estimates of Equation (5) 
payouts (
). In summary, the evidence in Table 7 suggests that firms that have the U.S. government as a major customer save less cash out of operating cash flows, corroborating our previous findings.
13 This calculation is based on the coefficients on and the interactions in column 2 of Table 7 . For example, the firm will save 23 cents out of every dollar of operating cash flows (= 0.385 -0.308×50%) if its major customer is the U.S. government.
Change in cash holdings for firms that lost government procurement contracts during George W. Bush's presidency: a quasi-natural experiment
Prior research examining supplier-customer relationships and capital structure choices is plagued by endogeneity concerns, and it has been a challenge for researchers to identify the causality between these two constructs. In this section, we exploit a quasi-natural experiment setting to explore the causal nature of the relation between U.S. government sales and corporate cash holdings. Specifically, we investigate how corporate cash holdings would change for firms that lost government procurement contracts after the U.S. presidential election of 2000. As shown in Figure 2 , aggregate sales to the U.S. government as a major customer for public firms declined during Bill Clinton's presidency (January 20, 1993 -January 20, 2001 ), but this tendency dramatically reversed during George W. Bush's presidency (January 20, 2001 -January 20, 2009 ). The U-shaped curve suggests that the U.S. government increased government spending aggressively during Bush's presidency.
We identify a subsample that consists of 192 firms that had government procurement contracts during Clinton's presidency but lost the contracts during Bush's presidency, since these firms are more likely to have lost the contracts for exogenous reasons, such as the presidential election of 2000. In particular, we require the firms having at least one sale and no sales to the U.S. government as a major customer before and after January 20, 2001, respectively. We also require the firms having at least four years of relevant data in each presidency regime. To identify the effect of government contracts on cash holdings, we replace the government sales variable ( ) in Equation (1) with a dummy variable that equals one for Clinton's presidency and zero for Bush's presidency ( ). All other variables are the same as in Equation (1). 
where the subscript i, j, t stands for firm i, industry j, and year t. As discussed above, losing government procurement contracts will increase firms' demand for cash holdings, so the dummy variable ( ) should have a negative coefficient ( ). Table 8 presents the estimates of Equation (6). Notably, the coefficients on is negative and significant (coeff. = -0.401, t = -3.21), suggesting that firms tend to hold less (more) cash when they won (lost) government procurement contracts during Clinton's (Bush's) presidency. Ceteris paribus, the ratio of cash holdings to net assets during Clinton's presidency is 33 percent lower ( ) than the one during Bush's presidency. To summarize, this quasi-natural experiment provides evidence to support the causality between corporate cash holdings and having the U.S. government as a major customer.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether firms' relation with the U.S. government as a major customer affects corporate cash holdings through various channels. Prior research has examined how firms' political connections, proxied by lobby contributions, campaign expenditures, or private access to politicians, influence their operating performance and stock value. Our study is the first study to document how firms' relation with the U.S. government as a major customer impacts their corporate finance policies in term of holding liquid assets, specifically, cash and cash equivalents.
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First, we document that firms that have the U.S. government as a major customer hold less cash and cash equivalents, compared with other firms. Using the framework proposed by Bates et al. (2009) , we attempt to explain why firms with U.S. government sales have lower cash holdings, and find that this phenomenon is attributable to both lower trade credits provided by suppliers and lower volatility of future profitability. Furthermore, we show that firms that have the U.S. government as a major customer have lower value of a marginal dollar of cash holdings.
Finally, our evidence suggests that these firms spend more cash out of operating cash flows relative to other firms, consistent with our main prediction.
Our study contributes to the extant literature on the determinants of firm's cash holdings.
Specifically, we identify an unexplored important determinant that explains the level of firm's cash holdings by focusing on the characteristics of the firm's customer base, in particular one major customer -the U.S. government. We do so by utilizing specific segment disclosures included in public firms filings. Although much of the evidence to date examines why firms hold more cash, our evidence provides both a statistical and economically plausible explanation for holding less cash.
Appendix: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition A change in variable from year t-1 to t, and (Compustat codes in parentheses).
SaleGov%
Sales to the U.S. government as a major customer as percentage of total sales (data obtained from Compustat segment files).
SaleFirm%
Sales to corporate major customers as a percentage of total sales (data obtained from Compustat segment files).
SaleOther%
Sales to other major customers as a percentage of total sales (data obtained from Compustat segment files).
SaleMC%
Total percentage sales to all major customers, i.e., the sum of SaleGov%, SaleFirm%, and SaleOther% (data obtained from Compustat segment files).
TA
Book value of total assets ( ).
NA
Net assets, calculated as total assets minus cash ( ). Ln(NA) is the natural logarithm of total assets.
Age
Firm age, calculated as the number of years the firm has Compustat data. Ln(Age) is the natural logarithm of firm age plus one, and Ln (Age) 2 is the squared value of Ln(Age).
Sales
Total sales, if total sales ( ) is less than aggregate sales from major customers (∑ ), then the measure equals the aggregate sales.
Cash
Cash and cash equivalents ( ).
TradeCredit
Trade credit, calculated as accounts payable to cost of goods sold ( ).
MVE
Market value of equity at the fiscal year end ( ).
FCF
Free cash flows ( ).
NWC
Net working capital ( ).
Capex
Capital expenditure ( ).
R&D
Research and development expenditure ( ). Missing values are set to zero.
Acquisition
Acquisition expenditure ( ).
Debt
Total Debt ( ).
DumDiv
A dummy variable equals to one if a firm paid common stock dividends ( ), and zero otherwise.
Dividend
Common dividend ( ).
ROA
Return on asset ( [ ).
CFO
Operating cash flows ( ).
Tobin's Q
Tobin's Q that equals market value of assets deflated by book value of assets ([ ).
σ (FCF/NA) t-4,t
Standard deviation of free cash flow to net assets ratio (FCF/NA) over the past five years (from year t-4 to t).
σ(ROA) t-4,t
Standard deviation of return-on-asset (ROA) over the past five years (from year t-4 to t).
indCFRISK
Industry cash flow risk, calculated as the mean of σ(FCF/NA) for firms in the same industry (Fama and French 49 industry classification).
CR
Current ratio, i.e., the ratio of non-cash current assets to total assets ( ).
B/M
Book-to-market ratio at the fiscal year end ( )
Liquidation
Liquidation cost, calculated as the ratio of finished goods to total inventory ( ).
OperCycle
Operating cycle, calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of days in inventory ( ) and days in receivables ( ). ln(OperCycle) is the natural logarithm of operating cycle. Days in payables (365 AP/COGS)
Ret
Annual stock returns, compounded using monthly returns on CRSP.
ExRet
Excess stock returns, adjusted by Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market matched portfolio returns from year t-1 to t (e.g., Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Dittmar and MahrtSmith, 2007) .
Earnings
Earnings before extraordinary items (
).
Interest
Interest expense ( ).
Payout
A dummy variable that equals one if a firm has common dividend or stock repurchases (Skinner, 2008) , and zero otherwise.
Rating
A dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a debt rating, and zero otherwise (Compustat credit ratings database). The value is set to missing for firms without positive debt.
NewFinance
New finance from year t-1 to t = net new equity issues ( ) + net new debt issues ( ).
Leverage
Leverage ( ).
ForeignTax
A dummy variable equals to one if a firm has taxable foreign income ( ), and zero otherwise.
Standard deviation of return-on-asset (ROA) in the following three years (from year t+1 to t+3).
Clinton
A dummy variable that equals one for Bill Clinton's presidency (01/20/1993 Clinton's presidency (01/20/ -01/20/2001 , and zero for George W. (6) for a subsample of firms that had at least one government sales during Bill Clinton's presidency but lost their government procurement contracts during George W. Bush's presidency. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of cash holdings ( ) scaled by net assets ( ). The independent variable is an indicator of Bill Clinton's presidency (January 20, 1993 -January 20, 2001 . Standard errors are clustered at both firm and year levels (Petersen, 2009) . Industry fixed effect is based on FamaFrench 49 industries. t-statistics are in parentheses below parameter estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variable are defined in the Appendix, and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. 
